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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (d), Utah Code Ann. (1988), whereby a 
defendant in a criminal action may take an appeal to the Court 
of Appeals from a final judgment in a Circuit Court. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 77-7-2 (1986) 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a 
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in 
the presence of any peace officer; "presence" includes 
all of the physical senses or any device that enhances 
the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical 
sense, or records the observations of any of the 
physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony 
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person 
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable 
cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission 
of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 77-7-15 (1980) 
Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect —• 
Grounds. A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his actions. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent : 
v. : Case No. 890120-CA 
MICHAEL W. ALVORD, : Priority #2 
Defendant-Appellant : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State will present additional facts that were not 
presented by the Appellant. At about 4:00 a.m., about five 
minutes after finishing a report on a gas theft that had been 
reported, Officer B.L. Smith caught a glimpse of a gray truck 
headed westbound on Downington from 200 East. (T: 5) Officer 
Smith sped up to to get a closer look at the vehicle and saw 
the truck turn southbound down an alley at about 125 East. (T: 
6) Since this occurred only about 45 minutes after the gas 
theft had occurred, Officer Smith found the vehicle similar 
enough to pull it over for further investigation. (T: 6) 
As Officer Smith approached the vehicle, he noticed a 
large amount of aluminum and boxes labeled "Jakeman 
Enterprises" in the bed of the pickup truck. (T: 7) He 
observed a clean cut driver which matched the suspect 
description. (T: 5 and 6) Smith testified that at the time he 
did not realize tnat the truck was a '76 Chevrolet and not a 
'68 Ford which had been reported as a possible description of 
the vehicle of the gas thief. (T: 30). He proceeded to check 
the gas gage and determined it was barely above empty. He then 
decided that this was not the gas theft suspect. 
However, Officer Smith became suspicious of the scrap 
metal in the back of the truck. Officer Smith has extensive 
experience with the crime of scrap metal theft. Smith has been 
a police officer for 18 years and spent four-and-a-half years 
as a business burglary detective. He had worked on 2,500 
cases, filed over 400 felony complaints and was a fully 
certified instructor in burglary investigation. (T: 4). 
Smith did not think that Alvord's explanation that he 
obtained the property over the past week made sense because the 
aluminum showed no signs of weathering, dust, or spotting. (T: 
11 and 16). Alvord also indicated that he was on parole to 
Officer Smith. (T: 16) Smith found out he was on parole for 
burglary. (T: 17) 
Backup officer, Sergeant Gilles who is an expert on 
burglary, arrived and also thought the scrap metal was stolen. 
Gilles went immediately to the address on the boxes in the back 
of the truck to investigate. Within ten minutes, he called 
Smitn to inform him that he had observed fresh drag marks and 
footprints. (T: 13) Alvord and Parker allowed Smith to see 
the soles of their shoes for comparison. (T: 13-14). The 
description of their shoes appeared to be similar to the 
footprints. (T:14) 
Smith detained Alvord and Parker for only 20-25 minutes 
to investigate the possible criminal activity. After he placed 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT T, TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT OFFICER SMITH HAD 
REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY TO 
JUSTIFY THE INITIAL STOP OF ALVORD'S VEHICLE 
WAS NOT ERRONEOUS. 
Officer Smith acted *cr ^rd^nc- * i *--i Section 77 -7 15, 
Utah, < :ode I : , (1 982) ; 
l 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
An investigatory stop falls short of an official arrest but the 
peace officer "must point to specific articulable facts which, 
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would 
lead a reasonable person to conclude [the suspect] had 
committed or was about to commit a crime." State v. Trujillo 
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987). 
In this case, Officer Smith had a reasonable suspicion 
that Alvord had committed gas theft because of (1) the reported 
gas theft about 45 minutes earlier, which he personally 
completed investigating five minutes earlier; (2) the 
similarity in appearance of Alvord's vehicle to that involved 
in the gas theft; (3) the neighborhood Alvord was driving in 
was near the gas theft; (4) the time of day; (5) the evasive 
move by Alvord in driving down a dark alley; and (b) Officer 
Smith's belief that Alvord's vehicle was in fact the suspect 
vehicle. These facts create a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity to justify the stop. Moreover, "a trained law 
enforcement officer may be able to perceive and articulate 
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the 
untrained observer," the officer may assess these facts in the 
light of his experience. _Ic3. at 88-89. The facts in this case 
are stronger than other Utah cases where a reasonable suspicion 
was articulated by the investigating officer. 
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The court rejected the defendant's claim of improper purpose 
for the stop since "[wjhen a police officer sees or hears 
conduct which gives rise to suspicion of crime, he has not only 
the right but the duty to make observations and investigations 
to determine whether the law is being violated; and if so, to 
take such measures as are necessary in the enforcement of the 
law." j^ d. (quoting State v. Folkes, 656 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 
1977), cert, denied 434 U.S. 971 (1977)). 
The defendant cites to State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 
(Utah 1985), State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) and 
State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987) to support his 
case. However, Baumgaertel distinguished these cases in that 
they involved only general suspicious behavior. In Carpena, 
" [tjhe stop was based merely on the fact that a car with 
out-of-state license plates was moving though a neighborhood 
late at night." Carpena, 714 P.2d at 675. Carpena, Trujillo, 
and Swanigan conclude that time of day and the neighborhood 
where a defendant was driving could not alone support a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The facts in this 
case do not revolve around general suspicious behavior alone. 
In our case we have the recent report of the gas theft, the 
similarity of the vehicle to the suspect description, the time 
of day, the closeness of the vehicle to the place of the theft 
and the officer's belief that Alvord's vehicle was the suspect 
vehicle. Moreover, Officer Smith would have been remiss if he 
had not stopped the vehicle he believed to be the suspect 
vehicle. 
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The first two levels have both been satisfied here, 
Alvord had already been pulled over. Officer Smith is free to 
ask any citizen any question he wants even without articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity is taking place as long as the 
citizen is not detained against his will. State v Trujillo, 
739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), and US v Mendenhall, 446 US 544 
(1980). There is no showing of duress, coercion, physical 
contact, threatening behavior or language, or threatening tone 
of voice on the part of the officers. Alvord and the passenger 
were not greatly outnumbered by police officers. There is no 
evidence of a display of guns by an officer, no evidence that 
appellant was told he could not go, no evidence that appellant 
did not believe he could refuse to answer questions or leave. 
Furthermore, the appellant did not argue below that he was 
compelled to stay and answer questions. In State v Arroyo, 770 
P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals held that 
issues of coercion should be brought up below and cannot be 
initiated at the appellate level. 
Moreover, after Alvord had been legally pulled over, 
Officer Smith articulated a reasonable suspicion that Alvord 
was in the process of committing metals theft and/or possession 
of stolen metal because of (1) the overloaded, unweathered 
scrap metal in boxes with "Jakeman Enterprises" printed on them 
in the back of the truck; (2) the gloves in the front seat; (3) 
the extensive experience of the officer with scrap metal theft; 
(4) the defendant's actions fit the normal scenario of scrap 
metal theft; (5) the time of day; and (6) the evasive 
- 8 -
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A recent report of metals theft was not necessary to 
allow the officer to further investigate possible criminal 
activity. See State v. Baumgaertel 762 P.2d 2 (Utah App. 
1988). Even " [t]hough there may be no probable cause to make 
an arrest, a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances 
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for 
investigating possible criminal behavior." State v. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980). A brief detention of 
20-25 minutes to investigate the possible metals theft was 
reasonable. 
The defendant is correct in asserting that, after 
discovered, evidence cannot justify the initial stop. However, 
in this case tne stop was not pretextual and not an 
exploitation of an impermissible stop. 
Again, a correction of error standard is applied. Oates 
v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988); State v. Arroyo, 770 
P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1989). And the trial judge's decision will 
not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct.App. 1988); State v. Ashe, 
745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). 
POINT III. TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT OFFICER SMITH HAD 
REASONABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH AND ARREST ALVORD 
WAS NOT ERRONEOUS. 
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection [citation omitted]." State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 
(Utah 1983). Alvord should not expect property open in the 
- 10 -
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arrested, both of which are crimes in Utah (76-6-404, UCA, 1973 
and 76-6-408, UCAf 1979). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct in finding that the initial 
stop of Alvord's vehicle was supported by a reasonable 
suspicion, pursuant to Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. (1982), 
that Alvord may have committed a gas theft. The subsequent 
questioning of Alvord to investigate a metals theft was a 
constitutionally permissible police encounter under the first 
two levels delineated in US v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, and is 
supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. All 
evidence derived therefrom is admissible in the criminal 
proceeding against Alvord. Finally, the arrest of Alvord was 
supported by ample probable cause based on all the evidence 
gathered during the investigation. Thus, the State asks this 
Court to affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. 
Respectfully submitted this of August, 1989. 
VIRGI 
Deput 
CHRISTENSEN 
unty Attorney 
iMAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association, 430 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this day of August, 1989 
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